The GATT and the Environment: Irreconcilable Differences? by Bogardus, John
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 
Volume 5 Article 8 
1-1-1996 
The GATT and the Environment: Irreconcilable Differences? 
John Bogardus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
John Bogardus, "The GATT and the Environment: Irreconcilable Differences?" (1996) 5 Dal J Leg Stud 237. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For 
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
THE GATT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? 
JOHN BOGARDUSt 
[GATT] is currently the greatest obstacle to the formation 
and enforcement of international agreements and 
domestic policies aimed at protecting the global 
environment. 1 
[T]he task for the next administration will be to extend 
the linkage between trade and the environment to the 
entire world trading system. GATT, the world trading 
organization, remains dead set against such change and it 
will take a few sticks of dynamite to blow that 
organization into the 21st century. 2 
Sustainable development: certainly one of the most interesting 
notions of our time. Some view this expression as an oxymoron, an 
ideal that is not logically possible over the long term due to the 
finite resources on which our continued development is based. 
Nevertheless, it is an ideal that politicians the world over are seeking 
to implement in practice. 
Assuredly, as we enter the 21st century, in order to increase our 
standards of living, to "develop," we will become increasingly 
reliant on the global marketplace. International trade has not only 
become necessary for the growth of developing nations but is also 
becoming essential for the continued growth of industrialized 
nations. 
t B.A. (British Columbia), LLB. (Dalhousie) anticipated 1997. 
1 K. G. Beacham, "International Trade and the Environment: Implications of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the Future of Environmental 
Protection Efforts" (1992) 3 Colo. J. Int'! Envt!. L. & Pol'y 655 at 681. 
2 B. Babbitt, "Next Step for Environmentalists: Redeeming 'Lost Opportunity' 
of This Year's Rio Summit" Roll Call, (28 September 1992) at 34. 
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However, our physical environment places limits on such 
growth. Only recently have these limits come to be more fully 
appreciated. It is in the interest of our species to ensure that the 
natural environment is conducive to our continued existence, and 
that the environment be "sustained." To this end, the 
environmental movement has developed into a powerful force on 
both national and international levels. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has 
governed the trading rules between its contracting parties since its 
inception in 1947.3 GATT has been subject to ancillary agreements 
over the years, including the latest and most comprehensive set of 
modifications coming as a result of the so-called Uruguay Round 
of Trade Negotiations. The Final Act Embodying the Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was signed 
in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.4 The Final Act included, as its 
substantive provisions, all of the Articles of the GATT along with a 
number of negotiated Understandings, Agreements and Decisions. 
The Final Act also called for the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (wTo) which came into being on January 1, 1995.5 
The raison d'etre of the WTO is to eliminate barriers of any sort that 
have an adverse impact upon trade between WTO contracting 
parties. 
Environmental leaders are concerned that an effective technique 
for promoting environmental ends, namely the threat or imposition 
of trade barriers, will no longer be available. The goals of 
development and sustainability have therefore come into direct 
conflict in the international arena. 
While this conflict had been developing over a long period of 
time, the release in 1991 of the GATT panel decision in the infamous 
Tuna/Dolphin case6 served to define the parameters of the debate. 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
4 The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Market 
Access for Goods and Services: Overview of the Results, (Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 
1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. Henceforth, the term GAIT will be used to signify the 
substantive provisions of the Final Act while WTO shall indicate the organization 
itself. However, current literature can, and does, use these terms interchangeably. 
5 Ibid at 6. 
6 United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Report of the Panel 
DS21/R, 39S BISD (1991) 155, 30 I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin case]. 
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This decision caught many in the environmental movement by 
surprise.7 While the GATT's mandate of wealth generation through 
increased trade was always somewhat at odds with the desire of 
many environmentalists to decrease production and consumption, 
prior to this case environmentalists had no concrete reason to view 
the GATT as anything but a benign entity. 
In light of the Tuna/Dolphin case, the GATT became an enemy. 
World-wide, environmental groups moved quickly to make their 
concerns known. Domestic leaders, particularly in the u.s. and the 
European Union (Eu), came under considerable pressure to make 
the environment a central topic of the ongoing Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations. 
This pressure was in part successful;8 environmental concerns 
made it into the Final Act in the form of the Decision on Trade 
and Environment.9 As a function of this resolution, a Committee on 
Trade and Environment was formed and shall report its initial 
findings and recommendations to the first biennial meeting of the 
Ministerial Conference, set to occur in 1996. 10 
The Committee is to address, inter alia, "the relationship 
between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to 
multilateral environmental agreements." 11 Currently, there exist 
In 1991 Mexico requested that a panel be established to determine if the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of the United States (MMPA) was in compliance with the 
GATT. Mexico was specifically concerned with an embargo applied against it by the 
u.s. Government in respect of yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products. This 
embargo was applied under a provision of the MMPA that required that the level 
of incidental killing of dolphins though purse-seine netting of tuna in a particular 
area comply with u.s. restrictions. The Panel found that the embargo was a 
prohibited quantitative restriction under GATT Article XI rather than a product 
requirement under Article III and could not be considered a valid exception under 
Article XX. 
7 See e.g.: E. Christian & S. Geffin, "GATT Sets Its Net on Environmental 
Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the 
Need for Reform of the International Trading System" (1992) 23 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 569. 
8 While some gains were made, there was still considerable concern for a time 
that the Final Act would not be passed by the u.s. Congress due, in part, to the 
sustained objections of various environmental groups. 
9 Final Act, supra note 4 at 469. 
10 Note that a Working Group on Environmental Measures and International 
Trade was convened by the GATT Council in 1991. 
11 Final Act, supra note 4 at 470. 
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provisions in the GATT that can be interpreted alternately to permit 
or exclude various environmental trade restrictions. Generally, trade 
measures taken in order to safeguard the domestic environment are 
permissible provided that they do not have protectionist effects.12 
On the other hand, generally speaking, trade measures that seek to 
have an impact on the environment outside of the implementing 
parties' jurisdiction are prohibited. 
It is accepted that the provisions allowing for non-protectionist 
environmental trade measures (ETMs) should be maintained. 
Instead, the committee shall focus on resolving the debate between 
proponents of the status quo and those who believe that there 
should be allowances for the "extrajurisdictional" application of 
ETMS. 13 
This paper shall serve as an exposition of the arguments for and 
against the extrajurisdictional application of ETMs. Potential 
compromises, along with possible and probable outcomes, shall be 
explored through an analysis of the permitted and prohibited types 
of ETMs. It is hoped that the following discussion contributes to a 
clearer understanding of the issues and fosters future accord. 
I. PERMISSIBLE ETMS 
The GA TT, contrary to the general perception of many 
environmentalists, allows for the extensive use of trade measures in 
support of environmental goals. In particular, Articles III and :XX14 
make ample allowances for the use of trade restrictions that are 
directed at environmental conservation within the jurisdiction of 
the importing country.15 
12 A protectionist trade measure is one that unfairly discriminates against imports 
thereby conferring a benefit upon domestically produced like products. 
l3 "Extrajurisdictionality" is a term apparently invented, but not directly defined, 
by the panel in the Tuna/Dolphin case, supra note 6. It shall be used here to refer to 
environmental trade measures that seek to impact upon the environment outside of 
the implementing party's own territorial jurisdiction. 
l4 Final Act, supra note 4 at 490, 519. 
l5 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Dangerous Liaisons: 
The World Trade Organization and the Environmental Agenda (Policy Staff Paper 
No. 94/14) by K.A. McCaskill (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, June 1994) at 12. 
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1. Article III 
With regard to Article III, any contracting party is permitted to 
impose restrictions on imported products so long as the restrictions 
are no less favourable than those accorded to like domestic 
products. For example, a ban on the presence of PCBs in 
transformers, equally applied to both foreign and domestic 
suppliers, would be permissible. 
However, Article III contains fundamental flaws from an 
environmentalist's point of view. For example, a restriction 
requiring that newsprint contain a certain percentage of recycled 
fibre may not be permissible; if recycled newsprint and virgin 
newsprint are determined to be "like" products, then a restriction 
adversely effecting imported virgin newsprint would violate Article 
III:4. 16 
Article III also only permits restrictions on imported 
"products," and cannot be invoked when it is the processes or 
production methods (PPM s) that result in the adverse 
environmental impact. Unfortunately, it is most often the by-
products of the production process-the waste and resource 
consumption-that are the most environmentally damaging. It has 
even been said that "[w]ithout the ability to regulate PPMs, 
environmental law would be virtually useless." 17 
The Tuna/Dolphin dispute presents a prime example of this 
problem. The GATT panel found that the impugned domestic 
provision was directed at the way in which the tuna was harvested 
and in no way applied to the tuna as a product. As the measure was 
directed at a production method, Article III could not be 
successfully invoked. 18 
2. Article XX 
Article XX allows for exceptions to be made to the general rules of 
the GATT where it is "necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health," or for those restrictions "relating to the conservation 
16 S. Charnovitz, "Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application 
to Environmental Trade Measures" (1994) 7 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 299 at 306. 
17 W. J. Snape III, & N. B. Lefkovitz, "Searching for GATT's Environmental 
Miranda: Are 'Process Standards' Getting 'Due Process?"' (1994) 27 Cornell Int'! 
L. J. 777 at 779. 
18 Tuna/Dolphin case, supra note 6 paras. 5.8-5.16. 
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of exhaustible natural resources." 19 The only express limitation on 
these measures is that they may not "constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade." 20 
Further limitations to Article XX have evolved as a result of 
disputes brought before GATT panels. The term "necessary" in 
Article XX(b) has alternately been interpreted to mean that there 
must exist no reasonable alternative measures21 or that the 
restriction must be the "least trade restrictive" and the "least 
inconsistent with GATT."22 Article XX(g) has been held to require 
that any trade measure that seeks an exemption under this section 
must be "primarily aimed at" conservation and must be taken in 
conjunction with domestic conservation provisions. 23 
However, by far the most distressing limitation implied by a 
GA TT panel with respect to Article XX originated in the 
Tuna/Dolphin dispute. In this case, the panel found that trade 
restrictions seeking an exemption under Article XX(b) or (g) could 
not succeed where the measure was to effect the environment 
beyond the importing country's jurisdiction.24 
In light of Article XI, and as a result of the implications of the 
Tuna/Dolphin decision, import prohibitions, sanctions and other 
restrictions based on process and production methods are 
prohibited. Nevertheless, many environmentalists argue that 
unilateral and multilateral trade measures that have precisely this 
effect are necessary and highly effective in the quest to ensure that 
the environment be "sustained." The advantages and disadvantages 
of the use of such ETMs shall be the next area of focus. 
19 Final Act, supra note 4 at 519. 
20 Ibid. 
21 United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. L/6439, 36S 
BISD (1990) 345. 
22 Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 
GAIT Doc. DS10/R, 37S BISD (1990) 200. 
23 Canada: Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT 
Doc. L/6268, 35S BISD (1988) 98 at 114. 
24 Tuna/Dolphin case, supra note 6 paras. 5.22-5.33. 
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II. PROHIBITED ETMS 
1. Unilaterally Imposed Trade Restrictions 
All but two of the contracting parties to the GATT, the u.s. and 
Austria, have expressly rejected the use of unilaterally imposed 
trade restrictions25 as a means to effect environmental programmes 
on other nations. 26 Conversely, many environmental groups, 
particularly those in the u.s. and in the EU, push for their continued 
use. This dispute is of some importance for not only are unilateral 
trade measures threatened and often used on a regular basis, but 
they are a technique that often achieves its objective. 
Unilateral trade measures have been in use since at least the 
early 19th century. Denmark and Great Britain, in 1804 and 1807 
respectively, each unilaterally prohibited the trade in human slaves. 
These actions eventually led to an international consensus on the 
matter. 27 
Unilateral trade measures are still in use. The EU, interestingly a 
GATTIWTO member that has generally rejected the use of unilateral 
restrictions, is in the process of engaging a ban on the importation 
of animal pelts that have been gathered through the use of steel leg-
hold traps. 28 While such a ban would most certainly be found in 
contravention of the GATT,29 the mere threat of its implementation 
has already been sufficient to bring into existence some of its 
objectives. Not only have the relevant parties, including Canada 
and the u.s., since engaged in multilateral negotiations, but some 
25 Unilateral trade measures are those initiated and applied solely at the 
discretion of the initiating party. ETMS that are brought about as a result of vety 
limited international consensus may also be considered unilateral rather than 
multilateral. 
26 GATT, Minutes of Mtg, C/M/248 (3 April 1991) at 17-26 [hereinafter GATT 
April 1991]; GATT, Minutes of Mtg, C/M/250 (28 June 1991) at 2-22 [hereinafter 
GATT June 1991]. 
27 Snape, supra note 17 at 784; S. Charnovitz, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green 
Trade: Defogging the Debate" (1994) 27 Cornell Im'! L. J. 459 at 493. 
28 EU, European Union Council, Regulation No. 3254/91, O.J. Legislation 
(1991) L.308. 
29 The EU is planning to ban the import of all furs harvested in countries where 
leg-hold traps are still in use. Therefore, as the EU is not planning to make an 
exception for those furs gathered using the acceptable, more humane, techniques 
neither Article III or Article XX could be successfully applied. 
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trappers have already switched to more "humane" methods in 
anticipation of an outcome favouring the Eu's position.3° 
Perhaps the best example of a highly effective use of unilateral 
trade measures is the Tuna/Dolphin controversy. As previously 
mentioned, the u.s. trade restriction was found to be in violation of 
GATT. However, by no means was this the end of the story. 
The u. s. made it clear that it would not remove the trade 
restriction and, as a result, the panel report was never adopted by 
the GATT Council.31 With no other choice, Mexico engaged the u.s. 
in bilateral discussions. After a lengthy negotiation, it appears that 
the dispute has been resolved not only to the satisfaction of both 
Mexico and the u. s., but also with the approval of the five 
environmental organizations that participated in the process.32 
The eventual outcome of the Tuna/Dolphin dispute leaves us 
with a crucial lesson to be learned. Simply put, the reality is that all 
too often unilateral action must be taken before an issue of 
importance can be brought to a head. 
This point was apparently lost on the original panel. The panel 
noted that its report should not be seen as affecting "the rights of 
individual contracting parties to ... cooperate with one another in 
harmonizing [environmental] policies, nor the right of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly to address international 
environmental problems."33 However, the panel evidently failed to 
30 "Canadian Fur Trade Given Reprieve" The Globe and Mail (23 November 
1995) Al, A9. 
31 At the time, for a panel report to be binding, it had to be ratified by the full 
GATT Council. However, under new rules adopted by the Final Act, panel decisions 
shall be adopted unless decided otherwise by the entirety of the Dispute Settlement 
Body. See "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes," GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A2 (15 December 1993) found in Final Act, 
supra note 4. 
32 There is a bill, currently on its way through the u.s. Congress, that would 
implement the Panama Declaration. The Declaration was signed in October 1995 
by the United States and other nations that fish the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP). 
The passage of this bill would lift the u.s. embargo for countries that participate in 
the agreement under the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. In exchange, 
the La Jolla Agreement, which sets dolphin mortality limits in the ETP, would 
become a binding legal instrument between the complying nations. See "Senators 
Seek Compromise in Dispute Over New Tuna-Dolphin Bill" Inside u.s. Trade 3 
November 1995) at 4. 
33 Tuna/Dolphin case, supra note 6 para. 6.4. 
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consider the fact that the u.s. had tried for years to negotiate a 
mutually acceptable agreement on this matter before it imposed 
any restrictive trade measures.34 
Therefore, the Tuna/Dolphin dispute reveals a fundamental 
problem. In many instances where the environmental concern is 
generated by an extrajurisdictional PPM, there exists no incentive 
for the other party or parties to engage in negotiations or to accede 
to any compromise. To use an old euphemism, the offending party 
already has the "carrot;" the offending party is free to trade under 
the rules of the GA TT. As a result, it is often necessary to first 
remove the "carrot" before any meaningful negotiation can take 
place. As noted, unilateral trade measures have been a direct and 
effective way of bringing about compliance with one's own agenda. 
But then, this is where the problems begin. Who has the right to 
set another nations environmental agenda? By requiring Mexico and 
the other ETP fishing nations to adhere to the u.s. protocol for tuna 
harvesting, the u.s. is, in effect, dictating the environmental 
standards of foreign nations. It is difficult to imagine how this 
could not offend the national sovereignty of the nation being 
forced into compliance. 
Also, it is significant that only the major powers can successfully 
bring about change in foreign countries' environmental policies as a 
result of unilateral action.35 Only the u.s. and the EU have large 
enough markets to make it necessary (from a business standpoint) 
for foreign producers to comply with their import conditions. 
Hence, all of the world's environmental policies could 
conceivably come to be dictated by the u.s. and the EU. Certainly, 
since Canada does not have a large enough market so as to be able 
to employ this tactic in any meaningful way, it is not in Canada's 
interest to have this approach available for use against Canadian 
exports.36 
On the other hand, it has been correctly noted that the issue of 
sovereignty is a double-edged sword: "[i]f there is a danger in the 
United States telling other countries how to produce certain goods, 
there is at least an equal danger in the GATT requiring the United 
34 Snape, supra note 17 at 784. 
35 GATT April 1991, GATT June 1991, supra note 26; McCaskill, supra note 15 at 
16. 
36 McCaskill, supra note 15 at 17. 
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States to accept products regardless of their environmental effect."37 
The issue then becomes whose sovereignty is more important, that 
of the importing or the exporting country. 
Understandably, developing nations have expressed a great deal 
of solidarity over this matter. Many developing nations simply lack 
the resources at this time to institute environmentally friendly 
production methods.38 They argue that if the developed nations 
wish to see more environmentally friendly PPMs put in place, the 
most effective way would be to permit an increase in their level of 
foreign trade so that they can generate the necessary revenue. 
Richard Elgin, Director of the Trade and Environment Division of 
the GATT Secretariat, stated: 
Further liberalisation [sic] of international trade flows, 
both in goods and services, has a key role to play: as a 
generator of foreign exchange earnings and wealth that 
can be used to help pay for environmental clean-up; as a 
more efficient allocator of resources, including 
environmental resources, to allow the same level of 
output to be produced at less resource cost; and in 
removing restrictive trade policies that also impact 
adversely on the environment.39 
Similarly, the United Nations Committee on Trade and 
Development has empirically demonstrated that a higher burden 
was placed on developing countries when they have had to adjust 
their production processes in response to changing environmental 
requirements in developed countries. 40 It is perfectly 
understandable that developing countries will be reticent in 
allowing changes to the GATT that make their position any more 
precarious than it already is. 
Perhaps the single most difficult problem to overcome in this 
area is, as Sir Leon Brittan of the EU has warned, there exists "a 
37 Snape, supra note 17 at 783. 
3B Peru and Pakistan have expressed the belief that countries that are as yet unable 
to meet the minimum needs of their citizenry should not be asked to assume the 
same level of responsibility for the environment as developed nations. GATT June 
1991, supra note 26 at 10, 16. 
39 R. Elgin, "Trade, Environment and the WTO" (Paper presented to 
International Bar Association Seminar, 24-26 November 1994) [unpublished] at 2. 
40 GATT, Trade and the Environment, Sub-Committee Completes Preparatory 
Work on Trade-Environment Issues, TE 011, (6 January 1995) 9. 
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serious risk of protectionist interests donning the 'fashionable cloak 
of environmentalism."' 41 Almost every nation that has made a 
written submission to the GA TT with respect to trade and 
environment has remarked that it is essential to ensure that 
environmental concerns not be used as a pretext for the creation of 
additional trade barriers.42 
While some may argue that this risk should be taken in the 
name of environmental conservation, in reality it is difficult to find 
a single environmental trade measure that has been challenged 
under the GATT that was not instituted for an ulterior protectionist 
motive. 43 Even the Tuna/Dolphin case, the decision that galvanized 
environmentalists against the GATT, appears almost certainly to have 
been an abuse of the system. The trade restriction enacted by the 
u.s. government was more likely a result of pressure being placed 
upon Congress by the strong Californian fishing lobby than a result 
of the actions of any environmental or animal rights groups. And, 
even if this observation is incorrect, the effect of the restriction was 
certainly to help the u.s. tuna fishing industry at the expense of 
Mexico and others. 
So now to ground us again in the real question. Clearly, 
unilateral trade restrictions will continue to be employed. The 
question is whether the GATTIWTO should in any way adopt 
provisions that allow for the use of such measures or to even simply 
condone their use by not effectively sanctioning nations that take 
such unilateral action contrary to the rules of the GATT. 
Although some commentators44 wish to see the WTO turn into 
an environmental watchdog, the vast majority of GATT/WTO 
members would dislike to see the continued use of unilateral 
4 l McCaskill, supra note 15 at 17. 
42 GATT April 1991, GATT June 1991, supra note 26. 
43 One of the only extrajurisdictional environmental action that does not appear 
to contain an element of protectionism was the recent threat of u.s. sanctions being 
taken against Japan with respect to hawksbill sea turtles and olive ridley. See S. 
Charnovitz, "Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX" (1991) 
25: 5 J. World Trade 37 at 37. 
44 See e.g.: D. C. Esty, Greening the Gatt: Trade, Environment and the Future 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994). Esty proposes that a 
Global Environmental Organization be created to work along side the WTO in 
order to properly monitor and help settle disputes related to the use of 
environmental trade measures. 
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measures, even where they are undertaken in an attempt to 
safeguard the environment.45 Ambassador H. Ukawa, Chair of the 
Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, stated: 
It has been widely agreed internationally (e.g., at UNCED, 
in the OECD and in the GATT discussions to date) that 
trade restrictions, even if used on a multilateral basis, are 
not the best or most appropriate means to achieve 
environmental objectives. Measures that deal directly 
with the root cause of the environmental problem and 
incentives that enable countries to cooperate, such as 
financial and technical assistance, will be more effective 
and efficient. 46 
Why then would the Committee on Trade and Environment 
recommend that the WTO allow or regulate the use of unilateral 
trade measures, even those aimed at environmental protection? 
Environmental organizations cannot expect, nor maybe should even 
desire, that the WTO would ever sanction the use of unilateral trade 
measures. 
III. MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS 
In the preceding section, there was a brief discussion about how, on 
occasion, unilateral action has led to multilateral agreement. Today 
there exist over 150 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAS) 
and this number is growing larger every year. MEAS are considered 
to offer long-term stable solutions to environmental problems as a 
result of their consensual and multinational nature. As a result, it is 
widely argued that parties to the GATT should make every effort to 
negotiate such agreements rather than resort to the sort of unilateral 
action described above.47 
45 GATT April 1991, GattJune 1991, supra note 26. 
46 McCaskill, supra note 15 at 18. 
47 See generally Beacham, supra note 1 at 668-670, and McCaskill, supra note 
15, 26. In the Report by the Group on Environmental Measures and International 
Trade, infta note 49 at 3, Ambassador Ukawa states that "[g]overnments' efforts to 
seek co-operative, multilateral solutions to environmental problems of a 
transboundary or a global nature are very much welcomed by GATT contracting 
parties, for there are clear grounds for believing that this approach will prove more 
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Unfortunately, there is a problem. Restrictive extrajurisdictional 
trade provisions, even when contained within a MEA, are not 
technically permissible under the GATT. While the GATT has never 
ruled that any trade restriction applied through a MEA to be "GATT-
illegal," environmentalists are still very concerned that such an 
outcome could still occur.48 The resolution of this problem was a 
priority for the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade.49 The group's work has been adopted by the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment.5° 
At last count, only a dozen MEAS contained provisions for trade 
restrictions that could be held to be in violation of the GA TT. 5 1 
While at first glance not a sizable number, some of the implicated 
treaties are among the most critically needed, from an 
environmentalist's point of view. In particular, implicated treaties 
include The Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 52 the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol),53 
and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel 
Convention).54 
The Tuna/Dolphin panel stated that, in its view, the adoption 
of its report would not effect "the right of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES acting jointly to address international environmental 
problems which can only be resolved through measures in conflict 
effective and durable than ad hoc resort (sic) to unilateral trade measures to try to 
deal with such problems." 
48 S. Charnovitz, "The World Trade Organization and Social Issues" (1994) 28: 
5 J. World Trade 17 at 28; Estey, supra note 45 at 218. Perhaps of even greater 
concern to the environmental community is that "GATT provisions could work to 
inhibit if not prevent a desirable conclusion of a fi1ture MEA" infra note 49 at 3 
[emphasis added]. It is conceivable that there are so few MEAS with restrictive trade 
measures only because the negotiating parties realize that inclusion of such measures 
would run counter to their pre-existing GATT obligations and hence, refrain from 
their inclusion. 
49 Report by Ambassador H. Ukawa (Japan), Chairman of the Group on 
Environmental Measures and International Trade, to the 49th Session of the 
Contracting Parties, GATT Doc. L/7402, (2 February 1994) at 3, Annex 1. 
50 Final Act, supra note 4 at 469. 
5! Beacham, supra note 1at670-75. 
52 3 March 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
53 16 September 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 26 I.L.M. 1550. 
54 22 March 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657. 
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with the present rules of the General Agreement."55 Whether the 
parties to the wTo/GATT do in fact have a right of this sort or, if 
not, how this right can be entrenched in the rules of the WTO to the 
satisfaction of environmentalists shall form the basis of the 
following discussion. 
Conflicts between treaties are governed by Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.56 Article 30 states that 
where a nation is subject to two treaties that contain incompatible 
provisions, the treaty entered into former in time will only apply to 
the extent that its provisions are compatible with the latter treaty.57 
Since the Final Act creating the WTO was signed in 1994, and since 
the Articles of the GATT were contained therein, the GATT would be 
held to trump all of the aforementioned MEAS under the rules of 
the Vienna Convention. 
Short of re-ratifying all of the impugned MEAS, it would appear 
that the only means of ensuring MEA supremacy is through some 
measure of change to the WTO!GATT itself. So why then might the 
Director of the Trade and Environment Division of the GATT 
Secretariat state that "[t]he provisions of [an] environmental 
agreement, including its dispute settlement provisions, would surely 
prevail in the case of a conflict"?58 
One probable reason may be that, given the specific nature of 
the MEAS and the fact that they were agreed to in full knowledge of 
the member nations' pre-existing obligations under the GATT, any 
GATT panel faced with deciding a conflict would find in favour of 
the MEA. To do otherwise would be to completely disregard the 
implicit approval previously given by the subscribing party to the 
MEA to have itself be subject to the imposition of the restrictive 
trade action contemplated in the MEA.59 
55 Tuna/Dolphin case, supra note 6, para. 6.4. 
56 23 May 1969, U.N. Doc. NCONF.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (Entered into 
force 27 January 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
57 Ibid at Arr. 30(3),(4). 
58 Elgin, supra note 39 at 3. 
59 In 1991, the CITES Standing Committee recommended that member nations 
prohibit all trade in endangered species with Thailand. Although Thailand was a 
parry to the treaty, it was ignoring particular provisions of the agreement. The 
CITES recommendation has since been lifted but not until after the u.s. applied 
import restrictions. See S. Charnovitz, "Environmental Trade Measures: 
Multilateral or Unilateral?" (1993) 23 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 154 at 156. 
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However, the environmental community appears to want more 
concrete assurances. One suggestion has been to make use of the 
waiver provision existing in Article XXV of the GATT. 60 By a two-
thirds majority vote the WTO!GATT membership can opt to waive 
GATT obligations.61 It is unlikely, though, that any MEA would be 
granted a waiver until after it had been challenged so, once again, it 
is uncertain that environmentalists would accept this route. 
There are some advantages to using the waiver approach. If 
applied on a case-by-case basis, the merits of each impugned 
measure of the MEA could be analyzed by the broader GATT 
community. If the measure were found to be based on legitimate 
scientific evidence and have sincere, multilateral support, then many 
of the fears surrounding the use of extrajurisdictional trade 
restrictions would be eliminated. 62 Concerns around disguised 
protectionism, effectiveness and necessity would all be addressed. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of disadvantages to the waiver 
approach: waivers do not give a measure of predictability, are 
cumbersome and, most important of all, are time-limited.63 Also, 
waivers were intended to be applied only in exceptional 
circumstances. Neither the WTO nor environmental organizations 
would or should wish to treat MEAS that address serious, long-term 
environmental problems as exceptions. 
The last feasible way to validate MEAS is for the contracting 
parties to come to an agreement about the interpretation of, or 
simply make changes to, Article XX of the GATT. Some parties to 
the GATT have already positively responded to the possibility of 
allowing MEAS to be considered an exception under Article XX 
provided that certain conditions are met.64 
60 S. Ostry & G. R. Winham, "The Post-Uruguay Round Trade Agenda" in S. 
Ostry & G.R. Winham, eds., The Halifax G-7 Summit: Issues on the Table, 
(Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995) 67. 
61 The waiver provision has been successfully used in the past. See]. Jackson, 
Changing GATT Rules, the Greening of World Trade, (Washington: EPA, 1993) at 
106. 
62 Ukawa, supra note 49 at 5. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. Once again, the conditions would revolve around ensuring the necessity 
and validity of the restrictions contained within the MEA as well as securing against 
possible protectionist abuses. 
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Problems and concerns associated with making allowances in 
this regard appear to be the least difficult to overcome of all the 
varied options. Some fear that this approach would necessitate the 
WTO to become an environmental arbitrator, having to make 
judgments on environmental issues outside of its realm of expertise. 
Similarly, there is concern over the practical difficulty of finding 
and implementing a single approach to this problem.65 
However, it appears inevitable that the WTO!GATT is going to 
have to deal with the problem presented by MEAS in some form or 
other. If not the status quo, this option seems the most practicable. 
Importantly, a change of this sort would presumably satisfy the 
environmental community, at least with respect to the single issue 
of permitting the use of trade restrictions between parties to an 
MEA. 
There still remains a stickier issue. MEAS, such as the Montreal 
Protocol, allow for the use of trade sanctions to be taken against 
non-parties to the MEA. Actions of this sort fall midway between 
purely unilateral measures and measures taken between subscribers 
to an MEA. Of course, all actions taken pursuant to an MEA are 
taken individually by member nations and hence can be considered 
to be essentially unilateral. However, when the action is condoned 
by the membership of the MEA, issues surrounding justification are 
greatly reduced. 
There are still problems. Firstly, there remain difficulties with 
respect to the issues of sovereignty and the ability of developing 
nations to comply with heightened standards. Secondly, the 
Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention and CITES, contain 
provisions requiring parties to apply even more severe trade 
restrictions to non-parties than to parties, which certainly could not 
be justified under the GATT. This leads to concerns that non-parties 
could be forced into joining particular MEAS in order to lessen 
potential sanctions. 
Any exception to GATT rules for environmental objectives, 
whether in the form of a waiver or under an agreement or revision 
of Article XX, would have to account for the latter problem. No 
change can occur when the possibility exists of trade measures being 
used in ways incompatible with the GATT/wTo's principles of non-
discrimination and freedom from protectionism. 
65 Ibid at 6. 
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Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely, no matter what level of 
security can be offered against potential abuse, that developing 
nations would ever willingly permit changes to the GATT that could 
give environmentally inclined nations the power to compel 
reformation of PPM standards. But, given that it is entirely possible 
that MBA members will begin to apply BTMs to non-parties, 
regardless of the rules of the GATT, the developing nations may wish 
to seek an agreement on the issue that would give them at least 
some measure of control over the use of such BTMS. 
Regardless, as many nations are still dogmatically opposed to 
allowing any form of BTMs, it is doubtful that an entrenched 
exemption to the non-party application of MBA-approved trade 
measures will be forthcoming in the near future. A more plausible 
scenario would see the adoption of an understanding between the 
GATTIWTO member nations to allow for MBA-approved trade 
measures to be applied between member nations. This 
understanding could be implemented through an express waiver or 
could simply take the form of an internal policy statement allowing 
for BTMS taken as a result of specifically negotiated multilateral 
agreements. In this way, environmental groups would be somewhat 
appeased while the GATT's fundamental precept of free trade would 
only be slightly undermined. 
IV. OBSERVATIONS 
The GA TT /wT o must satisfactorily resolve the issue of 
extrajurisdictional application of BTMs. Unilateral and multilateral 
BTMS presently apply and will continue to be applied. The WTO can 
no longer stand by and watch its rules be broken. The longer that 
contracting parties are permitted to openly violate the rules of the 
GATT in this manner, the weaker the whole international trade 
system will become. 
The WTO membership has three practical options. First, they 
could chose to strengthen the "teeth" of the GATT by allowing for 
the increased use of punitive measures against violators of GA TT 
rules. The problems with this approach are twofold: One, there is 
the fundamental problem of getting the contracting parties to agree 
on stronger penalties; second, there is the possibility of an all out 
international trade war if such penalties ever came into widespread 
use. 
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A second option is for the WTO to try and persuade its 
members, particularly the u. s. and the Eu, to stop applying 
prohibited ETMs. Unfortunately, regardless of any facts or logic 
that the WTO can bring forward in support of this position, there are 
two principle reasons why the position is likely doomed to failure: 
First, many environmental groups have no regard for national 
boundaries and little regard for the economic welfare that increased 
trade can generate. Hence, most of the arguments that the WTO 
could bring to bear would fall on deaf ears; second, in reacting to 
domestic environmental pressure, governments will on occasion 
find it politically expedient to enact ETMs rather than take internal 
actions that might offend other special interest groups. So, while 
particular governments care to varying extents about the 
environment in general, most nations will prefer to see other 
countries take action to preserve the global commons rather than 
impose measures that might have a negative impact upon the 
domestic economy. 
The final option for the WTO is to make allowances for 
environmental interests. Simply put, environmental groups, 
particularly in the u.s. and the EU, must be given some avenue for 
bringing about their desired ends. The trick for the WTO is to 
minimize the damage of this concession to the international trade 
regime. As previously mentioned, this would probably take the 
form of an exemption of some sort to multilateral environmental 
agreements. Whether to explicitly allow MEA-endorsed trade 
measures to apply to non-parties may be where the line gets drawn. 
In this way, the WTO may be able to eliminate the destabilizing use 
of unilateral trade measures. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Within the year, the WTo's Committee on Trade and Environment 
should be coming forth with various proposals on how to resolve the 
growing conflict between environmental issues and the GATT. Given 
the inherent uncertainty of international relations, no one can yet be 
assured of the outcome. Nevertheless, the environment and 
international trade have become intertwined, and the mess created 
must eventually be untangled. Sustainable development may yet 
prove to be a more difficult goal to realize than many might think. 
